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An adequate minimum code: a basis for 
freedom, justice and efficiency in the 
labour market 
Peter Brosnan and David Rea• 
This paper explores the case for expanding and improving the .minimum code of 
employment protections. A framework is developed for u.nderstanding the various 
"floors" which provide protection for .individuals within society. It is then argued 
that recent changes to these protections, in particular the Employment Contracts 
Act and the declin.e in social .welfare enti.tlements, have left many people vulnerable 
to exploitation and poverty. Strengthening the minimum code provides a solution to 
this problem. A better level of basic protections are also a spur to produc.t.ivi.ty. The 
paper argues that an .adequate minimum code encourages a more efficient use of 
labour. 
1. Introduction 
The debate over the Employment Contracts .Act has drawn attention to the fact that 
New Zealand has a basic floor of employment rights. 'This floor of employment rights, 
or minimum code, is a range of statutory provisions which provide minimum teuns and 
conditions of employment for almost all workers. Although it is only recently that 
statutory ·employment protections hav~e become known as the minimum code, they have, 
for nearly a century, been an important component of iabour market r~egulation. 
Recently, the significance of the basic e.mployment protections provided by the floor of 
rights has increased. The National Government's radical structural changes to the 
industrial relations system has simultaneously drawn attention to the existence of the 
:minimum code and cr~eated a need for it to be expanded and improved. 
Without an adequate floor of employment rights, the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 is seriously deficient. The new regime makes disadvantaged groups, - especially 
Maori, Pacific Island people, women, youth and some older workers, - more vulnerable to 
exploitation. The new legislation will greatly expand the number of workers employed 
in the segments of the labour market characterized by a self-reinfofcing ~cycle of low pay, 
disadv.antage and discrimination. 
Furthermore, the Employment ~Contracts Act has the potential to promote economic 
inefficiency. With the growth in low paid, casualiz,ed employment, fiians will have no 
incentives to invest in either worker training, or more efficient production techniques. 
These outcomes necessitate an expanded and improved minimum code, if deprivation 
and inefficiency are to be minimized. In this article we argue that the Government should 
take the following steps. First, the code should be widened by the inclusion of additional 
legal minima. As an example, statute should define a minimum r·equired period of notice 
before employer tenuination of the employment contract. Secondly, many of the 
existing protections should be improved. For example, the level of the minimum wage 
should be increased, and it should be widened to cover workers under 20 years of age. 
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Thirdly, there should be a regular assessment and modification of the minimum code 
through a consultative process. These steps will bring New Zealand into line with many 
of the developments in European labour law (Deakin, 1990). Instead of being simply a 
safety net, an improved minimu1n code should provide a floor of rights which would then 
provide an adequate base for individual and collective bargaining. 
2. Floors of social minima 
The living standards enjoyed by individual members of a society depend primarily on 
their access to cash income. Their level of consumption is dete11nined by what they can 
afford to buy and their capacity for having the value of these purchases augmented by 
production in the home; for example, making one's own clothes and preparing foods from 
basic ingredients, but the range of domestic production is limited both by social 
convention and therefore the availability of the basic inputs. Moreover, the time taken 
up by domestic production reduces the time available for paid work and therefore the 
income to pay for the basic inputs to domestic production. Thus everyone in a modem 
capitalist society must have direct, or indirect, access to monetary income to finance 
consumption. 
The extent to which each person is able to finance consumption varies eno1 n1ously. 
A small proportion of the population have access to interest income, or the profits of 
companies in which they hold shares. Another small group, some farmers, may have a 
degree of self-sufficiency. Approximately a third of the population have wage or salary 
incomes from full time jobs, but the rest, a majority, have to rely on support from other 
family members, part time work, the social welfare system, or some combination of 
these. Even this depiction is a little too simple, for now the social welfare system is 
being used to supplement the incomes of full time workers whose wages are inadequate 
for supporting other family members. 
A person's status and freedom is determined fundamentally by the level and source of 
the finance for consumption. Those with secure, well paid, full time jobs are free from 
dependence on others' income, and are ascribed positive values within society. Moreover, 
their income gives them power over other persons, such as their non-earning spouse or 
children, whose living standards are detennincd by the level of consumption which the 
wage earner is prepared to allow. The converse of this is that individuals who are reliant 
on others for the finance of their consumption are ipso facto unfree, and are ascribed fewer 
positive values. Thus wage earners are credited with more kudos than unemployed 
persons or family members, usually women, who augment the value of the monetary 
income through domestic labour. 
The freedom and status of individuals without access to full time employment can be 
enhanced by the social welfare system. For example, women who have access to a 
welfare income, such as the Domestic Purposes Benefit, can escape dependence on a 
marital relationship. Similarly unemployed workers; the availability of an 
unemployment benefit allows them to maintain their consumption and frees them from 
dependence on private charity. It also gives them some independence from employers, 
since the benefit level acts as a wage floor below which they would not have to work. 
But while the social welfare system reduces the degree of dependence on other family 
members, and on private charity, it creates a different level of dependence; dependence on 
the State, for the State is, on the one hand, benign and., on the other hand, coercive. In 
developing the social welfare system, governments have been motivated to protect 
citizens from absolute deprivation, but at the same time, they have also been concerned to 
protect traditional family structures and to maintain the relative advantage of employers in 
the labour market. Thus New Zealand welfare benefits are usually means tested against 
family income and invariably set well below the prevailing level of wages. One 
consequence is that young school leavers and women (or men) who cannot obtain full 
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time employment are denied access to social welfare in their own right and are forced into 
a dependent relationship on their parents or husband (or wife). In the case of young 
people, this prolongs the period of their "childhood". In the case of married women, their 
economic contribution is limited to undervalued domestic labour and, although the need 
for this increases with reduced cash income, they suffer a drop in status. 
Moreover, the low level of benefits makes existence precarious; thus, in times of 
high unemployment, unemployed workers are often forced to accept inferior jobs. And 
benefit levels tend to move countercyclically. When the economy is in recession, the 
number of unemployed increases and tax revenues decline. The government response is 
often to cut benefits, thus reinforcing the precarious situation of all workers. 
When workers become welfare beneficiaries, they experience a drop in income and a 
drop in status. This is encouraged by governments, and employers, but a distinction is 
made among the different categories of beneficiary. Retired workers or war veterans are 
generally treated as deserving of their pensions. People with disabilities and orphans are 
considered to be ~entitled to "public charity". Unemployed workers and single parents are 
given less sympathy., and are often depicted as being responsible for their own situation. 
One of the sad ironies of the business cycle is that the greater the number of unemployed, 
and thus the less the likelihood of finding a job, the more intense are the attacks on the 
status of unemployed people. 
Given these relationships between a person's economi~c position in society, their 
status, and their standard of living, levels of welfare benefits and wages ar~e the crucial 
determinants of individual and family liberty. Consequently gov~ernments have 
endeavoured over the last century to influence these through a variety of measures. The 
extent and complexity of welfare benefits has grown while direct and indir~ect regulation of 
the labour market has prooeeded in tandem. Until this year, State labour market 
regulation has been based upon the award system supplemented by individual bargaining, 
both, in tum, regulated by a combination of statute and the common law, and both 
underpinned by a floor of statutory rights. The combination of welfare and labour market 
regulation has created a series of .floors which provide different levels of protection for 
individuals, depending on their position, whether within or without the labour market. 
The only groups not protected by these floors are persons who are incapable of claiming 
their due rights, and illegal residents who hav~e no rights. 
The main floors of support are illustrated by figure 1. As the diagram shows, 
persons without employment and no other fonn of support suffer absolute deprivation. 
They can therefore fall to the level (a) in the diagram. Examples of such people are 
young persons unsupported by their families, and unable, or ineligible, to negotiat~e the 
social welfare bureaucracy. The most visible group in this category are street kids. 
Without access to support, their only option is begging or crime. For those who are able 
to clai.m welfare benefits, the level of public support provides a different limit to their 
living standards. 'They can fall no Io·wer than the level (c). There are many, however, 
who have no entitlement in their own right and must therefore rely on private support 
through families, churches and charitable agencies. They can therefore fall as low as level 
(b). 
These different floors provide so.me protection for employed people against 
exploitation. The diagram shows, however, that different workers have different floors of 
protection. 'The majority of employed workers are protected by the minimum code. Thus 
they can fall no lower than the level (e). Some categories of worker do not get the 
benefit of the minimum code. For example there is no minimum wage for teenagers. 
Thus the effective .floor of wages for them is the social welfare system (d). Very young 
workers, illegal workers (e.g. overstayers), and those who cannot negotiate alternative 
benefits, can fall to the levels provided by private support or below - U) and (k) in the 
diagram. 
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Figure 1: Floors of employment rights and other protections against deprivation 
. . . 
..... ' 
. . . . 
...... ' 
.·. ·.· ·.· 
.. · .... 
. . . . 
:::::::::: 
...... 
·:·:·:·:·. 
·.·.·.·.·. 
·.·.·.·.·.· 
·.· ... ·.·. 
:::::;:::: 
·.·. ·.·.·. :···:·:·:· 
0 •••• 
:· . ··:· 
Employed 
(h) 
-- ---- ---- --
(e) 
(d) 
G) 
--------------------------------------
(k) 
Above award agreements 
Individual contracts, 
second tier bargaining 
Awards and agreements 
Employment minima 
Minimum code 
Statutory minimum floor 
of employment rights 
Public support 
Social welfare, public health, 
accident compensation, etc. 
Private support 
Family, social networks, 
private charity, etc. 
Absolute deprivation 
The conciliation and arbitration system provided a more substantial floor of 
minimum terms and conditions in particular industries and occupations for workers 
employed in those trades. Thus workers covered by awards or agreements had a floor 
which prevented them falling below the levels specified in those documents (the level (h) 
in the diagram). The economic, social and political power possessed by certain groups -
primarily white educated males - allowed them to achieve levels of support higher than 
that provided in awards. Managers and some other white collar workers did not have 
awards but could negotiate superior conditions, well above the levels in awards - shown 
as (f) in the diagram. Some groups which had awards could negotiate better conditions 
than provided by awards, either on an individual basis, or codified as collective agreements 
(before 1987 referred to as second tier bargaining). These levels are depicted as (g) in the 
diagram. 
The industrial conciliation and arbitration system and the social welfare system, were 
the main mechanisms by which the State provided protection to individuals in the labour 
market. However, as the earlier discussion and the depiction in figure 1 illustrates, the 
system was not entirely comprehensive and some groups of workers were left without 
coverage. Because of this, the statutory minima which founed the minimum code 
provided an important additional level of protection. The development of these 3 different 
fouus of labour market regulation began largely with the legislative programme of the 
Liberal Governments in the 1890s. 
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3. Development of the minimum code 
Until 1991, the principles of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 
have been the celebrated mainstay of the industrial relations framework. The system 
combined stable trade unionism with bargaining centred around minimum te1nas and 
conditions of employment contained in awards. Disputes surrounding the negotiation and 
interpretation of these documents were resolved through conciliation and arbitration 
procedures. The latter was provided thfough the Arbitration Court or its successors, and 
this developed into an important policy instrument for the regulation of labour market 
outcomes. As an industrial relations framework, the industrial conciliation and 
arbitration system promoted productivity, at the same time as attempting to protect 
workers from exploitation. Awards and trade unions provided ·workers (who were covered 
by the system) with a degree of protection against exploitation. Productivity was 
promoted because the industrial relations system delivered bargaining outcomes at a low 
cost, with a minimum of industrial disruption and enforced similar wages and conditions 
on all e.mployers. Those which could not pay these wages were, therefore, forced to 
become more efficient or go out of business. 
The 1890s also saw the beginning of state sponsored welfare. The hardships of the 
economic depression of the late 1880s led to the development of an ethos of state 
responsibility for the welfare of individuals. This period of Liberal government saw the 
development of the education and health system and the implementation of pensions for 
the aged. However, it was not until the First Labour Government, and in particular the 
Social Security Act 1938, that a comprehensive syste.m of social welfare was constructed . 
This system, which provided support for the unemployed, and subsidized consumption, 
strengthened the labour market position of those individuals least able to protect 
themselves in the labour market 
The foundations of the minimum code were laid, in the nineteenth century with 
legislation such as the Employment of Females Act 1873. The 1890 Sweating 
Commission provided the impetus for the further development of the minimum code. 
The ~Commission's investigations which uncovered a range of exploitative employment 
practices, which had arisen during the long depression of t.he 1870s and 1880s, were 
influential in the Liberal Government's legislative programtne of the 1890s. 
Protection against unscrupulous employers paying workers in goods or kind was 
provided by the Truck Act 1891. .Also, the Factories Acts of 1891 and 1894 controlled 
hours of work and the manner in which wages could be paid, as well as creating a system 
of health and safety codes enforced by factory inspectors. Given the concern with 
"sweated labour", a major focus of the legislative programme was to regulate the 
employment of disadvantaged groups. Of interest in this regard was the Employment of 
Boys or Girls without Pay.ment Prevention Act 1899. This act fixed a universal 
minimum wage for young workers under 20 years of age. The Act stipulated that every 
young person under 18 years of age was to receive not less than 5 shillings (50 cents) a 
week, with an annual increment of not less than 3 shillings (30 cents) weekly until 
reaching the age of 20 (Woods, 1963).1 
For the majority of workers, the system worked welL This was largely because they 
were covered by awards and the protections of the indusuial ·Conciliation and arbitration 
system. However, for some workers there was no relevant award, and no effective trade 
union. This m~eant that they had to rely on the protection of statutory minima. After the 
onset of World War II, the Government found it necessary to direct labour to specific 
occupations. ~Concern that some of these jobs were not covered by awards led the Labour 
1 In 1990 dollars, this translates to $28 per week for 18 year olds, plus an extra $17 dollars 
per week for each additional year. This is clearly low compared to modem wag·e and 
benefit lev·els. Nevertheless, it provided a minimum for 18 and 19 year olds in excess of 
their entitlements today. 
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Government to improve the statutory 
Labour's new protections included a guaranteeof2 
(Annual Holidays Act 1944), and a minimum WIJO aet 
given statutory fo1n1 with the Minimum Wage Act M. 
for adult workers with different rates for males and 
1989). 
Since that time, the minimum code has been periodically uplal'ld8llll 
third week of annual holidays was added in 1974. Various 
discrimination have been implemented. The Equal Pay Act 1972, 1118 
Commission Act 1977 and the Employment Equity Act 1990 (now 
discrimination in the employment of certain groups. Also of intttllst, 
recognition of the statutory right to parental leave with the Parcmlal Lea-.. ad 
Employment Protection Act 1987. 
Thus, in the last century, the different forms of state sponsored emplO)'IMBt 
protection have evolved and expanded together. However, with the 
Contracts Act and the retrenchment in welfare entitlements, the range of labour ,..trel 
protections have changed fundamentally. This fact seems to have been recopized by tile 
Minister of Labour. At the time of promoting the new legislation, he promised to 
strengthen the minimum code of employment protections (Media statement, 23 April 
1991). Unfortunately, it was soon obvious that the Ministez's intention was simply to 
retain, rather than greatly expand, many of the existing statutory minima. Apart from an 
extension and a slight increase in leave entitlements (amendment to the Holidays Act 
1981), and a rearrangement of personal grievance provisions (the Employment Contlacts 
Act 1991 ), the code remained largely unchanged. Thus, disadvantaged segments of the 
labour-force are left with the meagre range of statutory employment protections 
below: 
(i) The Minimum Wage Act 1983 provides a statutory minimum floor for the wages of 
workers over the age of 20. The actual rate is prescribed by a Minimum Wage 
Order, the most recent being $245 for a 40 hour week. As can be seen from table 1, 
the real value of the minimum wage has declined considerably since its inception in 
1945. 
(ii) The Wages Protection Act 1983 provides for the manner in which wages must be 
both paid, and deducted, by an employer. 
(iii) The Holidays Act 1981 provides for minimum entitlements of holidays and leave. 
The Act specifies 11 paid statutory holidays for each worker. Allowing for 
weekends, these amount to an average of 8 days per year. The Act also stipulates 
that workers, after each year of employment, are allowed 3 weeks annual holidays 
on pay (or the cash equivalent if a worker quits before taking holidays). There is 
also provision for 5 days paid special leave for sickness, domestic or bereavement 
reasons after 6 months of employment. 
(iv) The Equal Pay Act 1972 provides for a limited measure of equal pay. 
Differentiation in pay rates on the grounds of sex is not allowed. Additionally, 
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, marital status, religion or 
country of origin in the hiring, firing, training or promotion of workers is made 
illegal by the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and the Race Relations Act 
1971. 
(v) The Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 provides for unpaid 
parental leave. Eligibility for this leave is guaranteed if a worker has been 
employed for at least 10 hours a week for over one year. Parental leave ensures that 
employees are entitled to have their jobs kept open for 52 weeks on the basis of 
maternity, paternity, extended or special leave. The entitlements are for both males 
and females, before, during, or after pregnancy or adoption. The Act also probibits 
the use of pregnancy as grounds for dismissal. 
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written copy of the employment contract, must be available to the worker on 
request 
Although the new legislation expands the floor of rights, the net effect has been to 
make things worse. By replacing awards with collective contracts, and significantly 
increasing the difficulty of collective action by workers, the new legislation has 
effectively removed a whole level of basic protections at the level of industries and 
occupations (see figure 1 ). This, combined with reduced social welfare provisions, has 
removed the protections which many workers once enjoyed. 
4. The impact of the Employment Contracts Act on the labour 
market 
The need for an expansion and improvement of the minimum code is clearly evident 
given the impact of the Employment Contracts Act on labour market interaction. This is 
because the labour market regulation provided by the new regime will significantly 
increase the intensity of segmentation and further accentuate patterns of disadvantage. 
These effects become apparent, given an understanding of the existing structure of the 
labour market, as well as the manner in which labour markets work. 
Unfortunately, much of the political justification for the new legislation has been 
based on a simplistic model of labour market adjustment. This has led to the assertion 
that the new regime will increase productivity. In particular, the Minister of Labour 
argued that productivity would be enhanced by removing the restrictive work practices of 
the award system (New Zealand Herald, 21 January 1991, p.6). However, apart from 
anecdotes of dubious significance, there seems to be little evidence to support such a 
proposition (Harbridge, 1990). Traditionally, a significant proportion of employers 
provided employment on terms and conditions over and above those stipulated by the 
award. Only a minority of employers, often the very worst, were actually constrained by 
the award system. This is backed up by a recent survey which indicated that many small 
employers felt contented with the previous system of industrial relations. The researchers 
argue that " ... most of these [surveyed] employers function basically unencumbered by 
unions or the labour relations system. This majority are untroubled by the national 
award system" (McAndrew and Hursthouse, 1991, p.9). 
At a broader level, much of the economic argument in support of the new legislation 
relates to labour market flexibility (Treasury; 1987, 1990). It is asserted that the new 
legislation will create wage rates which, because they are responsive to imbalances in the 
supply and demand of labour, provide more efficient co-ordination of the labour market. 
Such responsiveness is argued to lead to increased employment and enhanced prospects for 
the disadvantaged. It is assumed that competition, mediated by a flexible wage, will 
produce a labour market where workers of comparable productivity are rewarded equally. 
Within this paradigm, unemployment results from the absence of competition or a 
properly functioning price mechanism. Proponents of this view argue that creating a 
flexible wage mechanism which gives the unemployed the ability to underbid currently 
employed workers will provide an efficiency gain. It is claimed both that unemployment 
will disappear, and firms will be able to replace low productivity employed workers with 
high productivity unemployed workers. 
Unfortunately these arguments are based upon a false set of assumptions about the 
nature of labour markets and the sources of productivity gains. The misplaced emphasis 
on the productivity of individual workers obscures the fact that productivity is largely a 
creation of the internal organization of the firm. The relatively small differences in the 
supply characteristics of workers arc unimportant. More important dete1rninants of the 
productive efficiency of firms are the choice of production techniques, the efficiency of 
managerial structures, and the sophistication and utilization of capital. 
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The great weakness which undennines the view of the supporters of the new 
legislation is their assumption that real world labour markets could, or should, function 
in the same way as financial markets, or the simple models of economic textbooks. But 
employers do not regard workers as homogeneous, nor do they want workers to compete 
constantly for ~each others jobs. The reality is that labour is highly differentiated and 
competition between workers for jobs, and bctw~een fituas for labour, is limited by a the 
differing needs of frrans and the characteristics of individual workers. These barriers to 
competition, which are inuinsic to labour mark~ets, ~create segments of non-competing 
groups. 
Labour market segmentation results from the nature of the employment relationship. 
In contrast to the interaction which occurs in a spot auction ,market for goods, the labour 
~market does not involv~e an ex~change of clearly defined property rights. Instead, wages are 
exchanged for a promise of work. Fitans are interested in purchasing labour, but instead 
purchase labour power (Bowles and Gin tis, 1975). This labour market exchange Cfeates a 
long terna, socially constructed, strategic interaction between work~ers and employers 
called the employment relationship. This relationship changes the nature of competition 
in the labour market, and creates segmentation and non-competing groups. Fi1I11-specific 
human capital ('Oi, 1962), differential exit costs, internal labour markets (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971), the existence of social differentiation of workers through educational 
socialization (Bowles and Gintis, 1975), occupational licensing (Marsden, 1986), trade 
unions (Rubery., 1978)., the impact of domestic work (Humphries and Rubery 1984), 
discrimination (Roemer, 1979), and social networks (Mainwaring, 1984) are processes 
which may lead to segmentation. These characteristics of labour market interaction lead 
to separate markets or segments for different categories of workers. The result is that the 
labour market provides differential rewards to workers of comparable productivity. 
Segmentation ~occurs both on the demand and supply side. On the demand side, the 
labour market is differentiated into segments according to the structure of jobs and 
occupations. As an example, the differing degrees of frrrn specific human capital in jobs 
may give rise to different types of employment At the same time, the labour market is 
also differentiated into segments according to the social group supplying labour. For 
example, education produces a diffefentiated labour supply. The reinforcement of social 
roles, combined with baniers to participation., thus leads the education system to segment 
labour supply. 
The result of segmentation in both the supply and demand for labour is that that 
socially advantaged and powerful groups are able to secure access to the better jobs in the 
"primary" segments. In contrast, disadvantaged groups and those who cannot secure 
employment in good jobs, are relegated U> "secondary"' segments.2 
Segmentation causes the burden of labour market adjustment to be shared unequally. 
Within primary segments, the structure of employment ensures that unemployed workers 
are imperfect substitutes for employed workers. 'The result is that wages in the primary 
segments are relatively sticky, and there may be incentives for fit nas to maintain the level 
of real wages, despi~e a significant excess supply of labour. Advantaged workers in 
"good" jobs are therefore insulated from the effects of competi,tion. 
In contrast, the structure of employment in the secondary segments ensures that the 
unemployed are close substitutes for workers in "bad" jobs. The wages and conditions of 
workers in these jobs are therefore significantly responsive to changes in the supply or 
demand for labour. Disadvantaged workers in the secondary sector suffer the worst effects 
of competition because their terms and conditions of employment are significantly 
responsive to labour market imbalances. Instead of equalizing the return to skill or 
2 The terms primary and secondary segments are used heuristically. Rather than a dual labour 
market distinction, the terms are intended to point to the existence of ,a broad range of 
rewards for occupations of comparable productivity (Ryan, 1981 ). 
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productivity, competition ensures that those least able to protect the.mselves suffer 
hardship and exploitation. 
Table 2: The occupational distribution of the labour force 1986 
Occupational groups 
Males (N = 841338) 
Proportion of workforce 
Professionals 
Administrators and managers 
Clerical workers 
Sales workers 
Supervisors 
Skilled manual workers 
Unskilled manual workers 
Not specified 
Total: 
Females (N = 436866) 
Proportion of workforce 
Professionals 
Administrators and managers 
Clerical workers 
Sales workers 
S upcrvisors 
Skilled manual workers 
Unskilled manual workers 
Not specified 
Total: 
Non 
Polynesian 
89.8 
14.2 
11.5 
5.2 
7.4 
4.6 
31.8 
24.5 
0.8 
100.0 
89.3 
19.5 
5.8 
32.3 
10.1 
2.9 
11.6 
17.2 
0.6 
100.0 
Maori 
7.5 
3.9 
2.4 
2.9 
2.1 
3.9 
24.0 
58.9 
2.0 
100.0 
7.6 
9.6 
2.1 
17.3 
4.5 
3.1 
14.1 
47.3 
2.0 
100.0 
Source: Computed from 1986 Census, Series C, Vols. 4, 9 and 10. 
Pacific Island 
Polynesian 
2.7 
2.9 
1.2 
4.6 
1.5 
4.0 
28.9 
52 . 6 
4 . 3 
100.0 
3.1 
5.7 
1.2 
16.8 
1.9 
1.9 
21.5 
47.5 
3.7 
100.0 
The processes responsible for the structuring of the labour market during the last 
century of New Zealand history have produced a high concentration of disadvantaged 
groups in certain industries and occupations (table 2). Traditional labour market policies, 
particularly the conciliation and arbitration system, moderated the worst excesses of 
exploitation found in unregulated labour markets elsewhere, and largely prevented the 
development of a dual structure. However in doing this, they nevertheless allowed a 
particular pattern of segmentation to continue and develop. As an example, the industrial 
relations system often perpetuated wage relativities which maintained some occupations 
as low paid. At the same time, unemployment, employer discrimination, state policies 
which discouraged labour force participation, differentiated educational systems, and low 
returns to educational qualifications for some groups creat~ed a particular labour market 
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structure. The result, as table 3 implies, is that women, youth, Maori and Pacific Island 
Polynesian workers are currently concentrated disproportionately in low paid marginal 
segments (Brosnan and Wilson, 1989). 
Table 3: The distribution8 and incidenceb of low payc: 1989 
Males Females 
Ethnic origin Distribution Incidence Distribution Incidence 
% % % % 
Pakcha 81.8 20.9 80.8 37.3 
Maori 7.8 26.9 8.4 52.6 
Pacific Island 5.9 45 . 7 6.4 66.5 
Other 4.2 38.6 3.6 51.8 
Not specified 0.2 35.8 0.7 81.2 
All ethnic origins 100.0 22.4 100.0 39.9 
Source: Special analysis of 1988/1989 Household Expenditure and Income Survey data 
prepared for Low Pay Unit, Department of Labour. 
Notes: a Distribution is the number of low paid workers in the category as a percentage of 
all low paid workers. 
b Incidence is the number of low paid workers in the category as a percentage of all 
workers in the category. 
c Less than 68 percent of mean adult earnings. 
History has thus bequeathed New Zealand with a labour market structure characterized 
by inequality and a significant degree of persistent disadvantage. It is this structure which 
now becomes the base for the competitive individualized contracting of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. Sup porters argue that the new legislation will both erode this 
pattern of disadvantage and promote employment. It is more likely however, that the 
new system of industrial relations will accentuate the existing levels of disadvantage, and 
hinder economic growth. 
It is possible to make a number of predictions as to the effects of the new law given 
an understanding of labour market segmentation. The Employment Contracts Act 1991, 
by increasing the intensity of competition in the labour market, will lead to increased 
segmentation, poor productivity, less training, possibly negative employment growth, 
and the imposition of significant external costs on society. 
Labour market effects - increased segmentation 
The new legislation will accentuate the varying ability of different groups of workers 
to manipulate the supply and demand of labour. Because of this, advantaged groups will 
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maintain, and in some cases increase, their levels of remuneration from the labour 
market. In contrast, disadvantaged and socially powerless groups of workers will suffer 
declines in their tenns and conditions of employment 
Some types of occupations in the labour market are shielded from the effects of 
competition. For example, consider workers in monopoly industries where there is a 
history of strong and militant unionism. Unshackled from the award system, their 
conditions of employment may remain constant or, in some cases, even increase. Thus 
heightened labour market competition will not necessarily erode the teuns and conditions 
of employment for many advantaged groups of workers. Traditionally this has been 
demonstrated by senior managers and professionals. Although many of these groups have 
not been unionized, they have been able to use their power to maintain, or even improve 
their pay and conditions, despite economic downturns. 
This can be contrasted with the probable fate of disadvantaged workers who are 
concentrated in occupations which suffer the burden of labour market adjustment. 
Consider the experience of young people in an intensely competitive labour market. 
Young people are either concentrated at "ports of entry" within internal labour markets, or 
within the secondary sector. A significant amount of labour market adjustment occurs in 
these areas because the unemployed are close substitutes. At times of an excess supply 
of labour, young entrants to the labour market experience significant changes in wages, 
stability of tenure, and probability of unemployment. Without significant external 
protections, these young workers become vulnerable to exploitation. 
Of most concern, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 is a licence to create 
secondary sector employment. Thus we shall see a labour market characterized by 
worsening inequality. There will be an increasing concentration of Maori, women, youth 
and Pacific Island workers in marginalized, low paid and casualized occupations. The new 
legislation will intensify the culture of inefficiency, minimal training, discrimination and 
low pay in these disadvantaged segments. 
The impact on the firm - poor productivity 
In contrast to much of the current rhetoric of its supporters, the new legislation is 
likely to retard growth in productivity and employment. This can be argued even with 
the traditional economic model whole-heartedly endorsed by Treasury and the Business 
Roundtable. According to that model, finns choose a profit maximizing combination of 
capital and labour, based on their relative prices detennined in competitiv~e markets. 
However, because of the barriers to competition which give rise to labour market 
segmentation, there is no essential reason why wage rates under the new regime should 
approximate those that would exist under perfect competition. A "second best argument" 
(Lancaster and Lipsey, 1956) raises the possibility that increased labour market 
competition may accentuate the divergence of wages from the standard of perfect 
competition. This could also lead firms to choose inefficient and unproductive 
combinations of labour and capital. 
If a more realistic model of the firm is used, the proposition that low pay will result 
in poor productivity is even more convincing. Enabling finns to compete using low 
wage strategies provides no incenLives for the efficient utilization of labour. Worse than 
that, low wages actually provide an incentive to maintain out-dated production 
technologies. This will further intensify economic stagnation because it deflects 
attention from the real issues in productivity - improvements in capital and the 
deployment of skilled workers. 
The current cost of labour influences not only the firm's demand for labour given the 
current capital stock, but also decisions made by the finn in relation to both capital 
investment, and research and development. The historically irreversible nature of 
technological change ensures that self-reinforcing cycles perpetuate low wages and low 
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productivity. A decline in wage rates provides entreprenew-s with no incentive to upgrade 
the productive process, and this reinforces low wages. The positive alternative is to 
increase wages and therefore "shock" firms into up-dating technology. This will then 
increase productivity and spur further increases in wages. 
Tbe impact on workers - creating an unskilled workrorce. 
The new legislation will retard the development of a skilled workforce. This is 
because low pay, the growth of atypical or non-standard employment, and an enlarged 
secondary sector., all discourage training. Fi1ans have no incentive to train when labour is 
cheap or work~ers are seen as disposable. The same applies to employers using atypical 
employment fouus such as temporary employment or feigned self employment. Workers 
who are forced into feigned self employment (such as owner drivers) are unlikely to 
receive training. Their de facto "employers" have no incentives to train them. 
Furthetnaore, the workers themselves, as the de jure employers, tarely have the resources 
to fund their own training. This seems to have been demonstrated by a recent 
investigation into the forestry sector where contracting has lead to lower levels of training 
(Hamid, 1988). Declining levels of skill acquisition thus further rein~orce low 
productivity and low growth. The Act will ther·efore perpetuate the existence of the low 
skilled, low productivity segments of the labour market 
The macroeconomic implications 
The increased segmentation created by the new labour market environment will give 
rise to a divergence in the path of real wages. Given the significant excess supply of 
labour and the recessional ~economic climate, it is likely that the real wage will fall in 
many segments. However, the final r~esult of such a decline in real wages is difficult to 
predict Different pathways of economic adjustment give rise to contradictory effects in 
responses to a change in real wages. These have different macroeconomic implications. 
For example, a decline in real wages may hav·e some small positiv~e impact on 
employment in the longer terrn due to factor substitution and import/export demand 
effects. Alternatively, and of much greater significance in the short run, are the negative 
employment effects which occur through aggregate demand. 
Thus in contrast to the assumptions underlying much of the current economic debate, 
it is probable that raising the real wage in the poorest segments will actually increase 
employment Low income households have a high propensity to consume out of current 
income, and, furtheunore, consume a higher proportion of domestically produced goods. 
This means that raising their wages will increase aggregate demand, and domestic 
employment . 
The wider social costs 
The creation of significantly disadvantaged low paid segments of the labour market 
will have wider social costs. We have argued that the new legislation is likely to increase 
the size of the secondary segments of the labour market. Thus more employment will be 
characterized by low wages, high turnover, casualization, arbitrary discipline, 
discrimination and alienation. The experience of secondary sector employment will 
increasingly marginalize sections of the population. The effects of this will be to impose 
high external costs on society. A decline in wage income will lead to increased crime and 
consequent expenditure on the police and judicial systems. The creation of a culture of 
poverty will heighten the need for increases in various founs of social welfare and health 
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expenditure. Furthermore, heightened 
burdensome to the majority of the population 
5. Improving the minimum code 
Most of the adverse effects of the new legisladOR f81111t 
low paid secondary segments of the labour 11181bt. , 
and improved minimum code of employment condilions will 
cannot develop the very worst forms of employment. Aa 
therefore becomes a useful policy insttument, alleviadag many of tile 
most malignant effects. 
Under the new legislation, the meagre nature of statutory is a 
problem for some groups because the minimum code will provide their actual •d 
conditions of employmenl The problem is even more acute for tbese of 
where the protection of the minimum code is only partial. In , lite abslae8 a 
wage floor for workers under 20 years of age will create significant hardship 8BCI 
exploitation of young workers. An adequate minimum code wbich IJodl protMed 
protection for the disadvantaged, as well as incentives for efficiency, would include die 
following amendments to that which currently exists: 
Minimum wage The level of the minimum wage needs to be increased. An 
appropriate standard would be the European Decency Threshold which reqtdres the 
minimum wage to be no less than 68 percent of average adult earnings In New Zealand 
today, this would translate into approximately $375 per week, compared with the cmrent 
$245 per week. Also of utmost concern is the implementation of · minimum 
wages for workers under 20 years of age. Young workers in the labour market are often 
relatively powerless and occupy positions vulnerable to exploitation. Social welfare 
benefits provide de facto minima for many. However they are clearly inadequate, 
especially given the erosion of their levels and the narrowing of their eligibility criteria. 
Leave Entitlements to both holidays and sick leave should be increased. Compared 
to almost every developed country, the New Zealand holiday and leave provisions are less 
than adequate (Deakin, 1990). 
Hours The code should be improved to give a maximum 40 hour week with a 
statutory right to higher overtime rates (such as time and a half) for hours worked over 
and above this. 
Minimum notice Employers should be required to give a minimum period of 
notice (for example 2 weeks), or payments in lieu, before te11nination of the employment 
contract. The length of notice should increase with increasing length of service. For the 
case of redundancy, statute should require a longer minimum notice (such as 2 months). 
This is particularly important for ensuring that excessive casualization of work is not 
used by fiuns as a buffer against economic fluctuations. 
Redundancy .pay There should be a statutory right to redundancy pay, related to 
length of service. 
Protection against excessive casualization Employers should be prevented 
from using casualized labour, or other fonns of non-standard employment, as a device for 
avoiding legal requirements, or indeed, the provisions of the minimum code. For 
example, workers who have worked as casual employees for a certain period sboold be 
entitled to the minimum notice, and redundancy pay, if the casual employmeat 
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relationship is tetnainated. Similarly, casual employees who get appointed to permanent 
positions should have their service as casuals credited towards any entitlements based on 
length of service. 
Anti-discrimination Anti-discrimination laws should be improved. First, it 
should once again be mandatory for all large employers to operate equal employment 
opportunity programs. Secondly, pay equity legislation should be re-introduced. These 
provisions would go some way towards alleviating the effects of wage discrimination. 
Health and safety The current delay in the improvement of occupational health 
and safety legislation should be brought to an end. The Occupational Health and Safety 
Bill should be re-introduced in its original fonn so as to provide an adequately resourced 
and effective program to prevent work-place injuries. 
Monitoring The ability of the Department of Labour to monitor and enforce 
breaches of the minimu.m code should be radically improved. Without adequate 
monitoring, and the punishing of those who fail to comply, the efficacy of the minimum 
code will be seriously impaired. 
Consultation The minimum code should also be improv~ed by the addition of a 
consultative process to review the ~code. Groups involved in the negotiation of 
employment contracts should have an input into both the on-going evaluation of labour 
market outcomes, and the improvements of the minimum ~code, on a regular basis. 
Historically the New Zealand system of labour market regulation provided 
employm~ent protection via the processes of industrial conciliation and arbitration, the 
social welfar,e system, and a statutory floor of employment rights. However, because of 
the current removal of award protection, the erosion of social welfare entitlements, and 
the recessional state of the labour market, the need for an enhanced minimum code is 
greater ·than ever. Increasingly, the provisions of the minimum code will be the prime 
detenninant of the living standards for a significant section of the labour-force. 
We have argued that an adequate minimum code of employment protections will 
promote freedom, social justice and efficiency. Apart from the obvious neglect of social 
justice, these goals accord with the Minister of Labour's stated reason for the refonn of 
New Zealand labour law (Media statement, 23 April 1991). Given that an extensive 
minimum code wiU promote many of the governments labour market objectives, ther~e is 
a clear argument for immediate legislative action. 
Segmentation and an increase in the marginalized employment of disadvantaged 
groups will produce a labour market where many workers cannot be regarded as free. 
Freedom in th~e labour market is crucially dependent on the absence of poverty and 
exploitation. A strengthened minimum code will therefore protect the liberty of many 
groups of workers. 
Heightened levels of disadvantage within the labour market cannot provide a labour 
market whi~ch accords with the standards of social justice. A labour market where 
individuals are trapped in a vicious cycle of low pay, discrimination and exploitation does 
not provide any measure of ~equal opportunity.The protection afforded by an extensive 
minimum code will enhance the fairness or social justice of the labour market. 
Increased segmentation and the enlargement of secondary sector employment will 
create inefficiency. Declining real wages provide incentives for the inefficient utilization 
of labour, the abandonment of training, and a further depression of the ~economy through 
the short-term impact on aggregate demand. Inhibiting this process through a 
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strengthened minimum code will therefore promote efficiency and growth, and should 
thus be high on the agenda of any government. 
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